Update upstream and remove incompatible payloads

This commit is contained in:
2026-10-01 12:24:20 +01:00
parent 0017ea8fd4
commit bb6b46969f
5 changed files with 25 additions and 24 deletions
+7 -7
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Maintainer and agent handoff
Last updated: 2026-09-29
Last updated: 2026-10-01
This file is the durable handoff for future sessions. Start work from this
repository rather than from the upstream Relapse Exploit checkout.
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ https://github.com/ntfargo/Relapse-Exploit.git
Pinned upstream commit:
```text
09f10f5b58fab8a9ae9e8df214da37271290b13e
dd8e4e0914c5e9d066ee1f9b056be76cb992c8e0
```
Repository-local Git identity:
@@ -121,15 +121,17 @@ At the pinned upstream commit:
```text
de5dd480d12637527ba2d75e35de851adbb59c455293fa32588c492ef6b44b81 payloads/elfldr-ps5-1360.elf
26034dfbb88dd8be344fee1876c387bfcba0386edb079014e18ec25580368f6d payloads/etaHEN.elf
7cfb3a8cb86db67893c360ae3531f460f800e9f24039797038e6e81fc50f18a9 payloads/kexp_2026_05_25.bin
858880a8adbedaabfaced025384f4f6f908cfe44f1a049070ad8df911c22b972 payloads/kstuff.elf
0b30a1c23b83ebb2aa6523c8caaa5801ee89bde00e90cb36f392a29bb0bdb403 payloads/shadowmountplus.elf
```
The payloads are precompiled, stripped binaries. Hash matching proves consistency
with the reviewed snapshot; it does not prove that the binaries are safe.
This upstream revision removed etaHEN, KStuff, and ShadowMount+ plus the `R2`
auto-loader because those optional payloads caused compatibility issues. The page
now stops after starting the ELF loader; any additional reviewed ELF must be sent
externally to the PS5 on TCP port 9021.
## PS5 and DNS state
The local HTTP endpoint is available and verified at:
@@ -204,8 +206,6 @@ Important upstream findings from the initial static review:
3. Some early kernel failures return a result that the UI can misreport as root and
sandbox escape success.
4. The ELF loader on port 9021 is an arbitrary-payload interface by design.
5. ShadowMount+ includes an HTTP/JSON administration API; keep it on loopback or a
trusted LAN and never expose it publicly.
The wrapper's checksum and container hardening mitigate host-side packaging risks;
they do not correct these upstream kernel or payload risks.